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Ch 8 - Screencast 8.2 - Feasible price and quantity combinations and the isoprofit curve

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Ch 8 - Screencast 8.1 - The slope of the isoprofit curve

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Ch 7 - Screencast 7.4 - Price changes Income and substitution effects for normal goods

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Ch 7 - Screencast 7.3 - Social comparisons, work hours, and consumption as a social activity

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Ch 7 - Screencast 7.2 - Doing the best you can dividing your time

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Chapter 7 - Screencast 7.1 - The budget constraint and the utility-maximizing consumption bundle

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Ch 6 - Screencast 6.2 - Opportunity costs, feasible frontiers, and comparative advantage

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Ch 6 - Screencast 6.1 - Deriving the production possibilities frontier with economics of scale

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Ch 5 - Screencast 5.3 - Repeated interactions

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Ch 5 - Screencast 5.2 - Dynamics of the Nash equilibrium

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Ch 5 - Screencast 5.1 - Abdul maximizes utility subject to a constraint

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Ch 4 - Screencast 4.2 - Pareto efficient allocations in an Edgeworth box

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Ch 4 - Screencast 4.1 - Indifference curves and the Edgeworth box

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Ch 2 - Screencast 2.3 - Solving sequential games

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Ch 2 - Screencast 2.2 - Decision making under uncertainty Risk dominance

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Ch 2 - Screencast 2.1--Expected payoffs in an Assurance game (the Planting in Palanpur game)

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Ch 11 - Screencast 11.7 - The Whole Economy Model

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Ch 11 - Screencast 11.6 - The distribution of rents in employment

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Chapter 11 - Screencast 11.4 - The firm's profit-maximizing level of hiring

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Chapter 11 - Screencast 11.3.b - Labor discipline model - The incomplete contracting case

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Chapter 11 - Screencast 11.3 - The complete contracting case

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Chapter 11- Screencast 11.2 - Employment as a principal-agent relationship

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Chapter 11 - Work, Wages, and Unemployment - Intro

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Chapter 10 - Screencast 10.10 - Features of complete vs. incomplete contracts

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Chapter 10 - Screencast 10.9 - Comparison with the complete contract

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Chapter 10 - Screencast 10.8.b - Short-side power in the principal-agent relationship

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Chapter 10 - Screencast 10.8.a. - The agent's enforcement rent

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Chapter 10 - Screencast 10.7 - Pareto inefficiency at the Nash equilibrium

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Chapter 10 - Screencast 10.6.b - The Nash equilibrium of the Principal-Agent interaction

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Chapter 10 - Screencast 6.a. -- The Principal's Profit Maximization

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